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JANUARY-FEBRUARY, 1962
FAIR USE: AS VIEWED BY THE "USER"
By WILLIAM C. JENSEN*
The scholar is writing a treatise on Elizabethan drama and
would like to quote passages from an earlier work in the field. The
scientist is preparing a paper on a series of organic syntheses he
has performed and would like to set out earlier results obtained
in this area. The literary critic is writing a review of a new
novel and would like to quote its passages for the purpose of
criticism. The humorist is producing a comedy skit in which he
would like to parody a current dramatic Broadway play. If any
of these persons asked, "Do I have a right to make this particular
use of another's material?" the answer under copyright laws of
today would almost surely include a discussion of the complex and
crucial doctrine of "fair use."
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the kind of answer
that the copyright law doctrine of "fair use" gives to those who
ask "Do I have a right to make this particular use of another's
material;" to investigate whether the answer given in light of
our copyright policy is a just and proper one; and, finally, to deter-
mine whether a more correct and more certain answer can be in-
sured through legislation.
Investigation of these problems must start with the nature
and source of our copyright laws.
I. SOURCE OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
The Constitution does not establish copyrights, but provides
the Congress shall have the power to grant such rights if it
thinks best. Not primarily for the benefit of the author, but
primarily for the benefit of the public, such rights are
given. Not that any particular class of citizens, however
worthy, may benefit, but because the policy is believed
to be for the benefit of the great body of people, in that
it will stimulate writing and invention to give some bonus
to authors and inventors.1
In 1909, the Congress of the United States with the above words
firmly in tow, presented our present Copyright Act2 to the world.
The significance of these words should not be overlooked, for they
represent the Congressional interpretation of the ultimate source
of all copyright legislation in the United States-the constitutional
provision which authorizes Congress ". . . to promote the progress
of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors
and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries. ... -3 The constitutional provision and its subsequent
interpretation clearly indicate that the primary purpose of our
copyright laws is to advance the progress of science and the useful
* December groduate, University of Denver, College of tow.
I H. R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess (1909), reprinted in Howell, The Copyright Law 194,
200 (2ed. 1942).
2 The Copyright Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, consolidated and extensively
reformed the existing Federal copyright acts that dated back to the Act of May 31, 1790, c. 15,
1 Stat. 124. The present Copyright Act, Title 17 U.S.C. (1952), is a codification, with a few minor
revisions, of the Act of 1909.
3 U.S. Const. art. 1, §8, cl. 8.
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arts; the securing of benefits to authors being its secondary pur-
pose. 4 The seeds of justification for the doctrine of "fair use" lie
in this particular philosophical attitude towards our copyright laws.
This point will be discussed later.
The right to prevent a person from using the literary products
and works of another is based on Section 1 (a) of the Copyright
Act which states that "Any person entitled thereto, upon complying
with the provisions of this title, shall have the exclusive right:
(a) To print, reprint, publish, copy and vend the copyrighted work."-
Section 3 of the Act extends this exclusive right to "all the copy-
rightable component parts of the work protected."6 It is obvious
that the question put by our authors will receive a "yes" answer
when the prior work is not copyrighted, or when there has been
no copying 7 of the copyrighted work, or when the material used
was not a copyrightable component" part of the whole work. If
any of these three factors are present, there will be no invasion
of the literary rights and hence no basis for an infringement pro-
ceeding.9 When there is a copying of a protected component of a
copyrighted work without the owner's consent, the answer would
appear to be "no." However, a judicial restriction placed on these
statutory rights may allow the author to go ahead-a judicial
restriction known as "fair use." The response, therefore, must now
be in terms of "fair use"-it may be said that the use of copyrighted
material will be permitted if it is a fair use of such material. 0
4 See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954); Greenbie v. Noble, 151 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
5 17 U.S.C. § l(o) (1952). The rights of an author in his work, after publication, are entirely
statutory in that such rights can only be insured by compliance with the requrements of the Act.
This problem was first settled in the famous case of Donaldson v. Becket, 4 Burrous 2303 (1774),
which was decided 64 years after the passage of the Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Anne, c. 19, the
forerunner of all modern copyright legislation. The English court in Donaldson v. Becket held that
an author's common law perpetual right in his work remained only as long as the work was
unpublished and that the terms of the Statute of Anne provided his only protection after publico-
ton. In Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834), the Supreme Court followed the English
view that copyriaht legislation superseded common law rights in published works. The present
copyright act, 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1952), does preserve common low rights in unpublished works; England,
however, has abolished the distinction between common low and statutory rights and has brought
protection of all literary property under its copyright act. Copyright Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 46,
sec. 31. This paper will discuss only the use of materials from prior published works.
6 17 U.S.C. § 3 (1952).
7 A determination of whether a work has been "copied" is a most troublesome one in copyright
low. In 1909, Congress turned down the opportunity to define the word "copy." The House of
Representatives Report accompanying the Copyright Act of 1909 pointed out that the word "copy"
had been a part of the Copyright Act of 1790 and in view of its being construed so often by the
courts, it seemed undesirable to change or delete the word in the act. H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th
Cong. 2nd Sets. (1909), reprinted in Howell, The Copyright Law 194, 200 (2ed. 1942). It has been
said that "infringement of a copyright is judicially held to consist in the copying of some sub-
stantiol and material part of that as to which the statute affords protection," and to consti-
tute infringement, such copying must be "something which ordinary observations would cause to
be recognized as having been taken from the work of another." Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690,
691, 692 (2d Cir. 1926). While the quantity of the work taken has always been important in
determining whether there has been a "copying" or substantial appropriation, there seem to be
other elements worthy of consideration. See Rossett, Burlesque as Copyright Infringement, in
ASCAP, Copyright Law Symposium Number Nine 1, 9-13 (1958).
8 It is clear that a copyright does not protect every literary element in a work. There can be
no copyright of facts, Oxford Book Co. v. College Entrance Book Co., 98 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1938),
nor of historical events. Echevarria v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 12 F. Supp. 632 (S.D.Cal. 1935).
Moreover, it has been said that "theme," "plot" and "ideas" are not copyrightable elements; and
it is only the "expression" of a copyrighted work that is protected. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc.,
150 F.2d 613 (2d Cir. 1943); See Holmes v. Horst, 174 U.S. 82 (1899); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn
Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936). However, in attempting to separate a work into its
"plot," "theme" or "idea," it is well to keep the words of Judge Hough in mind: " 'Theme' is not
a word of art, and an examination of the cases will show that, where it has been used in decision
writing, it means a great deal more than the jealousy motif on which the fabric of Othello is hung,
or, to go to the other extreme of composition, the theorem of a proposition of Euclid." Dymow v.
Bolton, 11 F.2d 690, 692 (2d Cir. 1926).
9 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1952) reads: "If any person shall infringe the copyright in any work protected
under the copyright laws of the United States such person shall be liable: . . . "
10 See Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 131 F. Supp. 165, 174, n. 14 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
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II. RATIONALE OF DOCTRINE OF FAIR USE
Before attempting to determine whether a use of materials in
a particular literary field will be a "fair use," it is necessary to
examine the rationale and primary considerations behind the doc-
trine of "fair use." More importantly, it can be estimated whether
these considerations have been duly weighed in particular deter-
minations of fair use.
Any judicial limitation placed on a statutory right, such as the
doctrine of "fair use," must have a basis in some important under-
lying policy. Lord Mansfield stated such a policy for "fair use" in
1785:
In deciding it [the case] we must take care to guard
against two extremes equally prejudicial; the one, that
men of ability, who have employed their time for the
service of the community, may not be deprived of their
just merits; the other, that the world may not be deprived
of improvements, nor the progress of the arts be retarded.
The act that secures copy-right to authors guards against
the piracy of words and sentiments; but it does not prohibit
writing on the same subject."
The use of copyrighted material, then, is permitted when in so
doing the public will benefit from the author's work, without that
use seriously abusing the author's rights. It is a balancing of
interests.
Lord Mansfield's justification for the "fair use" doctrine is in
accord with the constitutional policy of our copyright laws. -1 2 The
policy involves the reconciliation of what might seem to be two
conflicting interests: the right of the author to retain complete
control over his works, and the right of the general oublic to
gain the benefit of the work. In a theoretical sense, these two
desires can be said to be consistent, in that the reward granted
the author will induce him to make public the product , of his
intellectual labors. 3 Nevertheless, to the degree that the two
interests are inconsistent in practice' 4 priority must be given to
the public, for "The copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes
reward to the owner a secondary consideration."'; From such a
policy arises the principal rationale for the doctrine of "fair use:"
encouragement of literary and other intellectual works for the
public benefit will be furthered by allowing subsequent authors
and publishers to make a "fair use" of a copyrighted work with-
out the consent of the copyrighted owner. 16 Every determination
of a fair use must ultimately rest on this rationale.
Other rationale have been advanced for the doctrine of "fair
use." It has been suggested that the doctrine is derived from the
11 Sayre v. Moore, 1 East 361, 102 Eng. Rep. 139, 140 (K.B. 1785).
12 Supro, notes I and 3.
13 See U.S. v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1947).
14 See Continental Cos. Co. v. Beardsley, 131 F. Supp. 2832 (S.D. N.Y. 1955).
15 U.S. v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1947).
16 Greenbie y. Noble, 151 F. Supp. 45, 67 (S.D. N.Y. 1957). "The right of subsequent authors
publishers and the general public to use the works of others to a limited extent has always been
universally recognized as consistent with the object of publication and the policy of encouraging the
dissemination of knowledge, learning and culture . . . " Ball, Law of Copyright and Literary
Property 259; as cited in Loew's Inc. y. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
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author's "implied consent" to a reasonable use 17 or from those
uses that are "reasonable and customary. s1 8 The "implied consent"
theory, however, seems to be realistic only to the extent that
the facts of a particular case indicate such a consent.1 9 It will
not serve as a rationale for all cases. The "reasonable and custom-
ary" theory seems to be nothing more than a statement that what
is "fair" is "reasonable and customary," and hence does not go
beyond the facts in any particular case. In any event, the two
theories are subordinated to, and are a part of the constitutional
rationale; 20 their ability lies in helping judges, in appropriate fact
situations, to implement the constitutional policy.
III. WHAT Is FAIR USE: ANSWERING THE QUESTION
How then, will the author's question: "may I make this par-
ticular use of another's material?" be answered? Whether his use
will be fair is a most difficult problem.2 1 While this question may
be a difficult one, the importance of the doctrine in copyright law
cannot be denied. It is said that the tests-
strike a scrupulous balance between the right of the author
to the product of his creative intellect and his imagination
and the right of the public in the dissemination of knowl-
edge and the promotion and progress of science and useful
arts which is the constitutional mandate in which the
American law of copyright originated.
2 2
Upon inquiring, the author and potential user would probably dis-
cover that what is fair use "depends on the circumstances of the
particular case." 23 Upon further inquiry, he would learn that the
factors considered relevant in a "fair use" case may include: the
17 E.g. Sampson v. Murdock Co. v. Seaver-Rodford, 140 Fed. 539 (1st Cir. 1905); American Institute
of Architects v. Fenichel, 41 F. Supp. 146 (S.D. N.Y. 1941); Karll v. Curtis Pub. Co., 39 F. Supp.
836 (E.D. Wis. 1941).
18See Wolf, An Outline Of Copyright lcws 143 cs c'ted in Shcp'ro, Brrnstein & Co. v, P. F.
Collier & Son Co., 26 U.S.PQ. 40, Copyr:ght Decisions, Copyright Off. Bull. No. 2C656 (S.D. N.Y.
1934).
19 See American Institute of Architects v. Fenichel, 41 F. Supp. 146 (S.D. N.Y. 1941), where the court
found that the au hor of crchitecturcl book forms had consented to their beng put to private use
by people working in the construction business.
20 See Show, Literary Property In The United States 67 (1950). Show finds that the inherent
nature of the copyright laws requrre that on author "dcdicate" a certain part of his work to the
public in return for his statutory protection. On page 67, he says .,. fair use is cll use dedicated
to the public by the nature of statutory copyright."
21 Lawrence v. Dona, 15 Fed. Cos. 26, 59 (No. 8, 136) (C.C.D. Mass. 1869).
22 Yonkwich, What Is Fair Use?, 22 Chi.L.Rev. 2C3, 213-14 (1954).
23 18 C.J.S. Copyright and Literary Property § 104 (1939): "Fair use may be made of books
or literary works, but what is fair use depends on the circumstances of the particulcr case.
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nature of the material used; the amount of the material used and
its value; the degree to which the new work will lessen the profits
or sales of the prior work; the possibility that the new work will
supersede the objects of the original work;2 4 the proportion of the
new work that contains only materials taken from prior works;
2 5
the kind of the intellectual area in which the user is working, the
labor and expense of the user saved by taking and using the mate-
rials of another;26 the extent to which the user's work and the work
from which he is borrowing are in direct competition;2 7 whether a
person has presumably consented to the use of his works ;2 the
presence of good faith or innocent intention on the part of the
user ;29 and the manner in which the borrowed materials are used
in the new work.
3 11
Obviously the many considerations and variables involved in
the doctrine make easy explanation impossible.
From the standpoint of a person contemplating a use of
another's material, a discussion of the "fair use" elements will be
beneficial only if it can be directed towards his field. Furthermore,
the particular type of use involved is a significant factor in a
fair use determination, 31 and therefore suggests an approach from
the standpoint of the planned use. Finally, and perhaps most im-
portant, this approach places emphasis on the constitutional
rationale underlying a determination of what is a "fair use." The
basis of our copyright laws and the constitutional policy behind
them is one of promoting "the progress of the sciences and the
useful arts;" but it is apparent that some areas of endeavor promote
the progress of the sciences and useful arts more than others. It
is therefore clear that a question of what is a 'fair use" requires
that a certain intellectual area or type of use be considered in light
of its social value or merit. This discussion will begin with a
consideration of the law of "fair use" as it has been applied in
certain types of intellectual areas and the particular uses therein
and then briefly reexamine these areas in light of constitutional
and policy considerations-attempting to discover whether the
answers to the author's questions have been correct.
IV. THE AREA OF LITERARY AND DRAMATIC CRITICISM-THE RIGHT TO
USE THE MATERIAL OF ANOTHER FOR COMMENT AND CRITICISM
The use of materials from copyrighted work for the purposes
of comment and criticism has traditionally been recognized as a
fair use. Justice Story, in 1841, said "Thus, for example, no one can
24 Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed. Cos. 342 (No. 4,901) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
25 Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1938).
26 Sam-son & Murdock Co. v. Seaver-Radford Co., 140 Fed. 539 (1st Cir. 1910).
27 W. H. Anderson Co. v. Bdwn Lcw Pub. Co., 27 F.2d 82 (6th C;r. 19281
.8 American Institute of Architects v. Fenichel, 41 F. Supp. 146 (S.D. N.Y. 1941).
29 Lawrence v. Dona, 15 Fed. Cos. 26 (No. 8, 136) (C.C.D. Mass. 1869).
34) Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. P. F. Collier & Son Co., 26 U.S.P.Q. 40, Copyright Decisions, Copy-
right Off. Bull. No. 20656 (S.D. N.Y. 1934).
31 S-e Public Affairs Associates, Inc. v. Rickover, 284 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1960). This case
involved a rzqurst for a declar.-tory judgment [action brought] by a publ's rr [for a declaration]
that Admiral Rickover could not restrict the use of quotations from this] public speeches and other
publications that had been distributed prior to his applying for a registration of a claim for a
copyright. The court heid for the publisher; a question arose as to the right to use for the purpose
of quotation or cr:ticisi,, materials from those works that were covered by a copyright. In dis-
cussing this question, Mr. Justice Reed at p. 272 stated: "Th's is a suit for declaratory judgment,
and appellant has not presented a copy of the book or pamphlet it intends to publish. Nor has it
otherwise unambiguously indicated just what use it plans to make of these later speeches. Without
the planned use before the court, it is, of course, impossible to determrne whether it is fair."
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doubt a reviewer may fairly cite largely from the original work,
if his design be really and truly to use the passage for the purposes
of fair and reasonable criticism. 3 2 Quoting of the exact text for the
purpose of criticism was early recognized in England to be a fair
use.3 3 Use of copyrighted work for the purposes of criticism does
not seem to be confined to literary criticism only. It has been said
that this type of fair use also extends to dramatic criticism, editorial
comment, and to mimicry and parodies.34 However, it is doubtful
whether mimicry and parody are given automatic acceptance by
the courts as an instance of fair use.
The fact that there are few reported cases on the question
of quotation for criticism being a "fair use" indicates that the par-
ticular type of practice is well accepted. While of no legal signifi-
cance, publishers often place a notice in newly published books
to the effect that a particular amount of the material may be
quoted for purposes of comment and criticism.
The recent case of Alexander v. Irving Trust Co. 35 presents an
element not usually found in a determination of "fair use" as it
relates to editorial comment and criticism. In this case the plaintiff
alleged that a two-page article she had caused to be published in a
medical journal, entitled "Oliver Wendell Holmes, Psychiatrist,"
was infringed by defendant's 270 page book entitled "The Psychia-
tric Novels of Oliver Wendell Holmes." The court found no appro-
priation; at the most there was only a borrowing of ideas. One of
plaintiff's contentions was that the quotations on the dust jacket of
the defendant's book invaded her legal rights because they stated
that the book was a "novel contribution" and presented "hitherto
unsuspected knowledge" on the work of Holmes. The court found
that the statements were "a fair use of comments made by third
parties concerning the defendant's work."3 6 The usual determination
of fair use concerns the originator of certain work and the one
who borrows from him. The court here seems to indicate that the
quotations used were "fair" in that they did not injure a third
party's (i.e., plaintiff's) rights. This determination of "fair use"
seems more akin to tort law than to copyright law.3 7
However, it is clear that the right of comment and criticism
is limited to what is reasonable. In Folsom v. March,3 the defendant
had published a book on the life of George Washington, copying
353 of its 866 pages from a previous work by the plaintiff on Wash-
ington. In answer to the defendant's assertion that this taking
was for the purpose of criticism, the court pointed out that if
important parts of the book were cited, not for purpose of criticism,
but for the purpose of superseding the use of the original work,
it would be a piracy.1 ' A finding of unfair use is often made in
32 Folsam v. Marsh, supra note 24, at 343.
33 Bell v. Whitehead, 3 Jurist 68 (1839).
34 Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. Inc. v. P. F. Collier & Son Co. 26 U.S.P.Q. 40, Copyright Decis'ons,
Copyright Off. Bull. No. 20656, 658 (S.D. N.Y. 1934). (dictum). "Dramatic criticism is one of the
most common forms of 'fair use.' Mimicry, editorial comment, and parodies are other varieties or
instances of 'fair use'."
35 132 F. Supp. 364 (S.D. N.Y. 1955), aff'd per curiam 228 F.2d 221 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 996 (1956).
36 Id. 132 F. Supp. at 369.
37 The privilege of fair comment or criticism in copyright law is analogous to the libel and
slander law privilege of fair comment on matters of public concern. For a discussion of the libel
and slander privilege, see Prosser, Torts § 95 (1955).




cases where the new work will tend to become a substitute for the
original-with a resulting unjust deprivation of the original author's
rights.
40
V. THE AREA OF LEGAL, SCIENTIFIC AND OTHER SCHOLARLY W6RK
The person desiring to use materials from prior works in this
field is given extensive leeway. The extent of the "fair use" doc-
trine in this field is indicated by the following statement: "This
doctrine permits a writer of scientific, legal, medical and similar
books or articles of learning to use even the identical words of ear-
lier books or writing dealing with the same subject matter. '41 This
latitude afforded workers in the scientific, legal and medical fields
is a well established one.42 Futhermore, it seems that courts will go
a long way in finding that a particular field is scientific or profes-
sional. In Sims v. Stanton,43 it was stated that "physiagnomy, the art
of reading faces, deserved recognition as a science" (in finding that
there was a fair use made of the plaintiff's work on this subject).
While it is true that facts, theories and ideas that have been
set down in prior works can be used since they are not copyright-
able,44 and that certain uses of the exact words of the prior work
are proper,45 elements appear which will limit such use.
The first element is competition. In one case 15% of the
word lists in a French Language book were used by the defendant
in his book-a book that was in competition with the prior work.
This was held to exceed the bounds of fair use.46 In a similar case
a certain type of alphabet groupings for Russian letters, unique
to the plaintiff's book, were used by the defendant in his Russian
language work. The appropriated lists made up only a small part
of the defendant's book, but the court found that such appropriation
was not a fair use, especially in view of the fact that the books
were in competition. The court also mentioned that there had been
no independent effort made on the part of the defendant in his
word groupings. 47 But this element, in the absence of a competitive
factor, is probably more properly confined to cases involving dic-
tionaries, form books, and the like.
48
One of the most troublesome problems in this area has been
the determination of fair use in those instances where citations,
case abstracts, and case lists from legal books have been used
in similar legal books. 49 The problem arises, in part, from the
necessity to classify the various legal publications by their essential
40 See Macmillan v. King, 223 Fed. 862 (D.C. Mass. 1914); Ginn & Co. v. Apollo Pub. Co., 215
Fed. 772 (E.D. Mass. 1914).
41 Thompson v. Gernsback, 94 F. Supp. 453, 454 (S.D. N.Y. 1950).
42 See W. H. Anderson Co. v. Baldwin Low Pub. Co., 27 F.2d 82 (6th Cir. 1928); West Publishing
Co. v. Edward Thompson Co., 176 Fed. 833 (2d Cir. 1910); Sampson & Murdock Co. v. Seaver-
Radford Co., 140 Fed. 539 (1st Cir. 1905).
43 75 Fed. 6 (N.D. Col. 1896). See also Eisenchiml v. Fawcett Publications Inc., 246 F.2d 598,
604 (2d Cir. 1957) where the court treated a True Magazine article on the death of Lincoln as a
"historical writing."
44 Oxford Book Co. v. College Entrance Book Co., 98 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1938).
45 Supro note 41.
46College Entrance Book Co. v. Amsco Book Co., 119 F.2d 874 (2d Cir. 1941).
47 Nikanov v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 246 F.2d 501 (2d.Cir. 1957).
48 See Weathersby and Sons v. international Horse Agency and Exchange, Ltd., 2 Ch. 297 (1910);
Jeweler's Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone Pub. Co.. 281 Fed. 83 (2d Cir. 1922).
49 The cases are difficult to reconcile. See W. H. Anderson Co. a. Baldwin Low Pub. Co., 27
F.2d 82 (6th Cir. 1928); West Pub. Co. v. Lawyers Co-op Pub. Co., 79 Fed. 756 (2d Cir. 1897);
Edward Thompson Co. v. Am. Law Book Co., 122 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1903); West Pub. Co. v. Edward
Thompson Co., 176 Fed. 833 (2d Cir. 1910).
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nature-whether they are textbooks in the professional sense or
whether they are mere lists and compilations. From a policy
standpoint, greater appropriation should be permitted from text-
books and treatises than from mere compilations or digests.
50
The fact that the digests, containing case lists and annotations,
are in direct competition with each other is another reason for
limiting the copying of case lists and annotations from prior works.
50 In W. H. Anderson Co. v. Baldwin Low Pub. Co., 27 F.2d 82, 89 (6th Cir. 1928), it was said:
. . . greater latitude is to be expected in the case of authors consulting other text books or
using directories and lists than in the case of one compiler attempting to make use of another
similar compilation."
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Novels and biographies fit into the literary and scientific fields.
In Toksuiq v. Bruce Pub. Co.,51 an action for infringement involved
two biographies of Hans Christian Anderson. It was alleged that
the second work was an infringement of the prior biography in
that the defendant had taken certain ideas, themes, and a few
quotations from the first work. It was found that such a use allowed
the defendant to write the book without going to all the Danish
sources. This was held to be an unfair use, the court stating that
the test for determining a fair use is "whether the one charged
with infringement has made an independent production, or made a
substantial and unfair use of the complainant's work. '52 Another
case involving biographies found no infringement, the emphasis
appearing to be on the policy of promoting the arts rather than
on "labor saving consideration.
'5 3
The emphasis on labor-saving devices, as mentioned before,
does not seem justified in cases in this area. This element is im-
portant when the works consist of mere lists or forms, for there
it would appear that the principle value of an author's property
is the labor that he expended in producing the works. In scholarly
areas, where the promotion of the arts is the paramount concern,
this factor should not be stressed.
VI. BUSINESS AREA-USES FOR COMMERCrAL PURPOSES
In moving from the scholarly to the commercial area, it can
be seen that the use of another's material will generally be more
restricted. This is because the profit and competitive factors are
more prevalent here. Substitution often appears. In a case where a
book giving the history of popular songs in the United States
contained the words and melody line of a copyrighted song, it
was held that the book provided a substitute for the song, even
though the song was no longer popular, and therefore the use
was not fair.54 The copying of a chorus of a copyrighted song be-
longing to a rival and competing publishing company was held to
be unfair;55 the use of a news item of a rival newspaper (involving
a substantial copying of the literary style of the item) was held
to be an infringement.
56
In Associated Music Publishers v. Debs Memorial Radio Fund,
57
the defendants claimed that the broadcasting of the plaintiff's
copyrighted composition was for the ultimate purpose of raising
funds for a charitable organization set up in honor of the late
Eugene Debs. However, it was found that the money for the fund
was to come in part from the radio station's profits and that the
broadcast was for the purpose of building up a listening audience so
that profits might be realized. The defendant's claim of fair use
was rejected.
In other commercial cases, the doctrine of de minimis non curat
51 181 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 195').
52 Id. at 667.
53 Greenbie v. Noble, 151 F. Supp. 45 (S.D. N.Y. 1957). This case involved a biography and
a magazine article on a famous woman in the Civil War.
54 Sayers v. Spaeth, Copyright Decisions, Copyright Off. Bull. No. 20,625 (S.D. N.Y. 1932).
55 Johns & Johns Printing Co. v. Paull-Pioneer Music Corp., 102 F.2d 282 (8th Cir. 1939).
56 Chicago Record-Herald Co. v. Tribune Ass'n, 275 Fed. 797 (7th Cir. 1921).
57 141 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1944).
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lex has apparently been applied in excusing small appropriations
of another's copyrighted work.58
Cases involving uses for the purposes of advertising have not
looked with favor on the defense of fair use. Perhaps the leading
case in the field is Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobbaco
Co.,5 9 where three sentences from a doctor's work on the human
voice were quoted, with credit, in a cigarette advertising pamphlet.
The quoted parts made up one-twentieth of the pamphlet. The
amount of material appropriated was small and there was no com-
petition between the pamphlet and the book. The court held that
the use was unfair, pointing out that the doctor was damaged in
that it would appear he had commercialized his work, thereby
retarding the sale of his book in academic and medical areas.6
Similarly, other cases have found an unfair use where the adver-
tising use constituted an appropriation of a valuable and essential
part of the plaintiff's work."'
Cases involving the use of business forms are examples of situa-
tions where the rationale of "implied consent" in fair use is relevant
and realistic. The courts can readily find that the use of the form
is to be expected, is impliedly consented to, and is in fact the sole
reason for the preparing of the form. In a case involving forms at-
tached to ledger books, the United States Supreme Court said, "...
the teachings of science and the rules and methods of useful #art
have their final end in application and use; and their application
and use are what the public derives from the publication of a book
that teaches them. '62 Cases involving architectural forms63 and in-
surance forms64 have followed this reasoning; the cases in this gen-
eral area hold that the public is entitled to copy and use the very
outline and words of the form. 65
Before leaving this area, it is important to note those situations
involving the use of copyrighted material for an "incidental" or
"background" purpose. There are at least three reported cases in-
volving the use of copyrighted song lyrics in a magazine article. In
Karll v. Curtis Pub. Co.,66 a magazine article on the Green Bay
Packers contained the lyrics of a song written by a Packer fan who
had dedicated it to the football team. This was held to be a fair use,
the court finding a mere incidental use and one to which the song-
writer had implicitly consented.67 Two other cases involved the use
of song lyrics as a background or setting in a magazine article; in
58'See Kane v. Penna. Broadcasting Co., 73 F. Supp. 307 (D.C.D. Pa. 1947) (radio broadcast used
small portions of plaintiff's pamphlet on historical facts). Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Hobaro
Mfg. Co., 189 F. Supp. 275 (S.D. N.Y. 1960). Defendant's sales bulletin for salesmen's use quoted
portions of plaintiff's consumers research magazine which had criticized some of the features of
dishwasher manufactured by the defendant. The portions were quoted for the purpose of attacking
the conclusions reached by the consumer magazine.
59 23 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1938).
60 Id. at 304.
61 Conde Nast Pub., Inc. v. Vogue School of Fashion Modelling Inc., 105 F. Supp. 325 (S.D. N.Y.
1952) (advertising brochure for modelling school contained substantial reproduction of Vogue
magazine cover). Robertson v. Batten, Barton, Durstine & Osborne, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 795 (S.D. Cal.
1946) (A singing beer commercial used the parts of plaintiff's copyrighted song upon which rested
the success and popular appeal of the song).
62 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104 (1879).
63 Continental Casualty Co. v. Beardsley, 151 F. Supp. 28 (S.D. N.Y. 1957).
64 American Institute of Architects v. Fenichel, 41 F. Supp. 146 (S. D. N.Y. 1941).
65 Crume v. Poc. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 140 F.2d 182 (7th Cr. 1944). In speaking of a business form,
this court, at 184, stated, "Its use, to which the public is entitled, con be effected solely by the em-
ployment of words descriptive thereof."
6639 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Wis. 1941).
6T Id. at 837.
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each, there was a finding of fair use.68 The reasoning of the courts
in these decisions seems justified in that the use of the materials
did not economically harm the plaintiff nor did the article serve
as a substitute for his song. The point here is that the use was made
for the purpose of setting a background and in no way affected any
economic rights that the author had or may still have had in the
songs themselves.
VII. THE AREA OF PARODY-USE OF MATERIALS FOR PURPOSE OF
BURLESQUE OR PARODY
Rules governing the application of the doctrine of "fair use" in
in the area of parody and burlesque have not been clearly estab-
lished by the courts. There have only been a few cases on the prob-
lem. Furthermore, the existing cases have, in a strict literary sense,
only dealt with what is known as "burlesque," and have not decided
questions concerning true "parody." 69 However, the two terms will
be used interchangeably here, in that both signify a type of intel-
lectual or artistic creation apart from the borrowed work.
To begin with, at least three of the cases in this area involved
a mimicry or "take off" which, strictly speaking, was not a use of
a copyrightable component part of a work. In Bloom & Hamlin v.
Nixon,70 the defendant mimicked the gestures and mannerisms of
a popular singer of the day, using the copyrighted chorus of a song
identified with the popular artist. The court held that gestures and
mannerisms in a performance were not copyrightable. The use of
the chorus of the copyrighted song was held to be "incidental" and
a mere vehicle for the mimicry performance. 71 The court also said,
by way of dictum, that the good faith of the mimicry was essential
if there was to be a finding of non-infringement. 72
Two other cases concerned the mimicking of popular singers
and actresses. Infringement was found in one where the mimic had
used an entire copyrighted song as her "taking off point; '73 in the
other there was no evidence showing a substantial using of a copy-
righted song.74 Neither of the cases involved a burlesque of an act-
ual copyrighted work-the use of the songs was incidental to the
burlesque.
In Hill v. Whalen & Martell, Inc.,775 the defendant put on a
stage performance involving two characters named "Nutt and Giff,"
6A Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. P. F. Collier & Co., 26 U.S.P.Q. 40, Copyright Decisions, Copyright
Off. Bull. No. 20,656 (S.D. N.Y. 1934); Broadway Music Corp. v. F-R. Pub. Corp., 31 F. Supp. 817
(S.D. N.Y. 1940). (In this case the chorus of the song constituted 50% of the total article).
69 See Macdonald, Parodies, An Anthology From Chaucer To Beerbohm-And After 557-68 (1960).
In the appendix to the Anthology, Macdonald sets out some definitions for the various forms of
"humor" generally referred to as "parody." He defines travesty as a form that " . . . raises laughs,
from the belly rather than the head, by putting high, classic characters into prosaic situations, with
o corresponding stepping-down of the language." He says that burlesque "... imitates the style of
the original" and "it differs from parody in that the writer is concerned with the original not in
itself but merely on a device for topical humor." Parody is said to " . . . concentrate on the style
and thought of the original" and "at its best, it is a form of literary criticism."
In many instances, classification following the definition above would be difficult. If however,
we take parody to mean a type of literary criticism, we have a traditional situation for the applica-
tion of the "fair use" doctrine. The absence of any reported cases concerning "parody" (as defined
by Macdonald) suggests that this type of use has always been considered "reasonable and customary"
-a "fair use." The cases that hove been reported in this area seem, for the most part, to fall under
Macdonald's definition of "burlesque."
70 125 Fed. 977 (E.D. Pa. 1903).
71 Id. at 978.
72 Ibid.
73 Green v. Minzensheimer, 177 Fed. 286 (S.D. N.Y. 1909).
74 Green v. Luby, 177 Fed. 287 (S.D. N.Y. 1909).
75 220 Fed. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1914).
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who were presented in the garb and spoke in the manner of Mutt
and Jeff, the cartoon characters. The court held that this went be-
yond a parody and in fact became a substitute for Mutt and Jeff,
thereby reducing the demand for the Mutt and Jeff works.76 As
shown above, the element of substitution or harm to the plaintiff
through a reduction in demand for his works is a compelling reason
for a refusal to find a fair use.
77
Two recent decisions involving television burlesque or skits of
movies constitute the only real case law on the question of burlesque
being a fair use. In Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 7
an injunction was granted enjoining Jack Benny from parodying
the movie Gaslight on his television program. The parody closely
followed the plot, dramatic incidents, and the expression of the
original movie. The court found that there was a substantial copy-
ing and appropriation of the movie-beyond the realm of fair use.
The court emphasized the commercial factor involved in the tele-
vision skit, finding that fair use is more restricted in a commercial
area than in areas of science and art. The judge did not treat parody
as a particular instance of a valuable art and literary form which
could call for a more liberal application of the "fair use" doctrine.
76 Id. at 360. The court said: "A copyrighted work is subject to fair critic'sm, serious Cr humorous,"
but that such a use would not be permitted when the result will be to "mater:ally reduce the demand
for the originol." The court also said that the reduction in demand must result from the fcct that
the use constituted a substitute; that mere adverse criticism, even if it reduced the demand, would not
be an unfair use.
77 See Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 3C2 (E.D. Pa. 1938).
78 131 F. Supo. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955), aff'd sub. noma. Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532
(9th Cir. 1956), aff'd without opinion by equally divided court, 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
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The Columbia Pictures Corp. v. Nat'l Broadcasting Co. 9 case
involved a Sid Caesar skit entitled "From Here to Obscurity"-a
burlesque of the movie From Here to Eternity. In this case the plot
was altered considerably in the skit, characters were deleted, and
the dramatic incidents combined. The parody seemingly served as
a mere vehicle for Sid Caesar pratfalls. Judge Carter, who had de-
cided the Jack Benny case, also decided this one. He found for the
defendant. In this case, he stated that the doctrine of "fair use"
would permit some taking in order to "conjure up, at least'the gen-
eral image, of the original"8 0 in the minds of the audience.
The two decisions are not entirely consistent. The doctrine of
"fair use" was never seriously considered in the Benny case-its
application in the Caesar decision does not indicate whether it could
ever be applicable in a situation like the Benny case. More impor-
tant, parody is not given express recognition as an art form in either
case; the uses were treated as uses in a commercial area. These two
decisions have not succeeded in determining the true application
of fair use in parody and burlesque situations. To the extent that
they hinder the doctrine's use, the cases seem undesirable.
VIII. A REEXAMINATION OF THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE
IN LIGHT OF OUR COPYRIGHT LAW POLICY
Having examined the principle areas of copyright law in which
the doctrine of "fair use" is applied, it must now be determined
whether the answers that our authors have received have been cor-
rect in view of the fair use rationale.
Our constitutional policy requires that the judicial process in
copyright law give primary attention to the advancement of "science
and the useful arts." This necessitates some type of value judgment
in the area of endeavor being considered. Traditionally, this has
been done. The fields of science and learning are considered to be
of greater value and worth to our culture than the field of adver-
tising, and therefore, more deserving of encouragement. Conse-
quently, one is allowed greater freedom to use the materials in the
scientific than in the commercial areas.
Generally speaking, the fields that have been historically con-
sidered beneficial to the advancement of learning are recognized
and given due weight in copyright law. However, the two recent
parody cases are examples of a failure to give proper recognition
and consideration to a field that has been long deemed a desirable
form of artistic creation."l In denying its place in our culture, and
in refusing to expressly apply the doctrine of "fair use" to its activ-
ities, the cases have restricted its growth.
It is submitted that the same results in the cases could have
been reached through application of the "fair use" doctrine. The
right to recognition as a distinct literary area could have been
granted without opening the door to infringement. First of all,
neither parody presented competition or caused economic harm to
79 137 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Ca?. 1955).
90 Id. at 350.
81 See Yankwich, Parody and Burlesque in the Law of Copyright, 33 Can. Bar Rev. 1130-37 (1955)




the movies from which they borrowed. In fact, each parody prob-
ably helped popularize the particular borrowed work.
Secondly, the Benny case presented elements that usually miti-
gate against the application of the "fair use" doctrine. It can be said
that the parody here did not constitute a new work; little in the
way of original material was added. This is a substantial appropria-
tion of the plaintiff's labor, even though he has suffered no economic
harm, and so is probably not a fair use.
82
Conversely, Caesar's use of the material from the From Here
to Eternity movie can be classified as an "incidental" use. The ma-
terial taken was used for a different purpose ("taking-off point"
for jokes and slapstick) in the skit than in the movie. The incidents
borrowed evoked different emotional responses in the skit than
they did within the movie's framework. The humor of the skit did
not compete with the dramatic moods of the movie. As such, the
use is similar to the incidental and background uses of song lyrics
in magazine articles.
8 3
The fact that a just result was reached without relying on the
fair use doctrine is not a justification for not applying it. The pre-
cedents of the decisions, especially the Benny one, may seriously
restrict proper use in parody fields in the future.
In summary, it would appear that, with the exception of the
areas of parody and burlesque, the doctrine of "fair use" is being
applied with the constitutional rationale behind the doctrines well
in mind. It is hoped that the future brings the application of the
rationale to all fields of copyright endeavor.
CONCLUSION
The examination of the doctrine of "fair use" is now completed.
The source and rationale of the doctrine has been discussed and its
application to various areas investigated. The law's answer to the
question: "May I make this particular use of another's material?"
has been, with the exception of the parody area, a proper one. Legis-
lation must now be considered.
A case for laboratory study in the consideration of codification
of the "fair use" doctrine is Hawkes & Son, Ltd. v. Paramount Film
Service, Ltd.8 4 This case was decided under the British "fair dealing"
statute, which provided that the following shall not constitute an
infringement of a copyright: "Any fair dealing with any work for
purposes of private study, research, criticism, review, or newspaper
summary. 8s 5 The action arose at a hospital opening in England
where a newsreel company was filming the events of the opening.
In taking pictures of a boys' military band, there came on to the
soundtrack of the film twenty-eight bars of the "Colonel Bogey"
March, which the boys were playing. The owner of the copyright
on the march sued. for infringement. A lower court judge found no
82 See Weatherby & Sons v. Internat'l Horse Agency and Exchange, Ltd., 2 Ch. 297 (1910).
83 Cases cited, supra note 68. Sid Caesar's selection of only a few dramatic incidents from the
Eternity movie for use in his skit would correspond with the definition of burlesque as given by Dr.
Frank Baxter, who testified, as on expert on parody and burlesque in the Benny case. Dr.
Baxter described burlesque as a technique by which reference is made to one or two or more of the
incidents in the original for purposes of identification, and then the burlesque "takes off into the
blue" with its own story or plot. Loew's, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 131 F. Supp. 165, 183
n. 48 (1955). 84 1 Ch. 593 (1943).
84 1 Ch. 593 (1934).
85 Copyright Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5 c. 46 (s. 261) proviso (i).
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substantial appropriation or, in the alternative, a "fair dealing."
The appellate court found that there was a taking which was not
excused under the fair dealing statute. One judge, to his "regret,"8 6
found that there was an infringement, even though he felt there
was no injury-he could not bring the taking under the "fair deal-
ing" statute. The "regretable" decision here was not necessarily the
result of an inherent evil in codification. A phrase covering inciden-
tal newsreel shots in the statute would have saved the day for the
defendant. However, the view of the judges appeared to indicate
a basic flaw in such a statute. Under this provision it is still neces-
sary to decide whether the quantity or quality of that taken was
fair or unfair. The interpretation of the word "fair" is still left to
the court. Consequently it would seem that legislation is not the
answer.
The answer to the question, and the correction of mistakes in
the application of the doctrine of "fair use," must ultimately be
sought in the judicial process. What has been pointed out here, and
contended for, in the judicial process, is a more conscious alignment
with the constitutional rationale behind fair use. This means a con-
sideration for the advancement of the arts and an accompanying
expansion of the "fair use" doctrine where the needs of society and
the interest of progress call for them. Judge Palmieri has observed:
The general purposes of copyright protection are to afford
authors the right to reap the fruits of their expression and
to promote the store of information and objects of culture
available for public enjoyment and application. Usually
these two purposes are not' inconsistent. When, however,
an author's monopoly threatens to infringe unduly on pub-
lic use of the ideas or objects of that expression, the courts
have demonstrated flexibility in adjusting the conflicting
theories. Thus copyrightability may be altogether denied,
or, if copyright is upheld, restrictively protected by requir-
ing almost verbatim copying to constitute infringement.
In other situations, the subject and purpose of copyright
may be explicitly defined so as not to authorize an over-
generalized monopoly which would restrict fair use of the
disclosed information or objects.
87
SO Hawkes and Son, Ltd. v. Paramount Film Service, Ltd., 1 Ch. 593, 608 (1934).
87 Continental Cos. Co. v. Beardsley, 151 F. Supp. 28, 31-32 (S.D. N.Y. 1957).
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